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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
LYNN KING, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
No. 14192 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a criminal action charging appellant 
with the offense of unlawful distribution of a controlled 
substance for value. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court. From a verdict 
of guilty to the offense as charged, the defendant appeals, 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment, and 
a judgment of acquittal in his favor as a matter of law. 
In the alternative, appellant would seek to have the 
judgment set aside and be granted a new trial. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The case was submitted to the court on stipu-
lated facts. Said stipulation is contained in the trans-
cript part of the designated record on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
UNDER UTAH LAW A PERSON WHO MERELY ACTS AS THE 
PROCURING AGENT OF THE BUYER IN AN ILLEGAL DRUG SALE AND 
RECEIVES NO PROFIT THEREBY CANNOT BE CONVICTED AS A SELLER 
OF DRUGS. 
The Utah courts have already considered the issue 
presented in the case of State v. Schultz, 27 Utah 2d 391, 
496 P.2d 893, (Utah 1972), reh. 28 Utah 2d 240, 501 P.2d 
106, which involved a similar fact situation. Two police 
agents in Schultz asked the defendant to locate a drug 
dealer so that they could make a purchase. The agents 
gave defendant $20.00 for the drugs. Defendant left to 
meet with an unidentified dealer and shortly returned with 
some heroin, giving it to the agents. Defendant was 
charged and convicted of the sale of narcotics. At trial, 
one of the police agents testified that defendant had made 
a prior drug sale to him. The defendant admitted that he 
sometimes would help addicts procure drugs "as a favor." 
The first Schultz decision discussed entrapment. On 
rehearing, the issue of agency was raised. The Utah 
Supreme Court said: 
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The facts would support the proposition 
that defendant was induced by the enforcement 
officer to procure the controlled substance 
as the sale agent of the officer, and that 
the defendant had had no prior association 
with the seller, nor was he acting in concert 
with the seller in the transaction. The record 
would also support the proposition that the 
defendant did not profit from the transaction. 
Id, at 107. 
Under such circumstances the court held that defendant was 
entitled to an instruction that if defendant acted solely 
for the benefit of the buyer and at the latter's direction, 
defendant would not be guilty of selling narcotics. The 
Utah court stated that such an instruction exemplified the 
"better rule" as found in Massachusetts, New York, and 
Texas. 
In reaching its decision in Schultz, the Utah 
Court specifically referred to three cases concerning the 
procuring agent defense; Durham v. State, 162 Cr. 25, 280 
S.W. 2d 737 (Tex. 1955); Adams v. U. S., 220 F.2d 297 
(5th Cir. 1955), and U. S. v. Moses, 220 F.2d 166 (3rd 
Cir. 1955). 
Durham, supra, involved the same fact situation 
as the instant case. In appealing the conviction for 
selling narcotics, the defendant raised two issues, entrap-
ment and the procuring agent defense. The Criminal Appellate 
Court of Texas in reversing the judgment stated: 
If an accused is in no way interested 
in behalf of the seller but acts only as 
agent of the prosecutor he is not guilty 
of making a sale. This is especially true 
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where the agent makes the purchase for the 
accomodation of the prosecutor and delivers 
the narcotics to him without any advance in 
. price over what he paid. 280 S.W. 2d at 739. 
Since defendant gained no benefit, no sale had occurred. 
Without a sale, the Texas Court saw no need to discuss 
entrapment. The Durham courtfs approval of the procuring 
agent rule was reaffirmed without modification in Smith 
v. State, 396 S.W. 2d 876 (Tex. Cr. 1965). 
A slightly different fact pattern was presented 
in Adams v. U. S., supra. An informant asked the defendant 
to obtain some drugs. The defendant agreed but said that 
the supplier would only deal with her and not the informant. 
On two separate occasions, the informant gave the defendant 
money for drugs. The informant testified that defendant 
told him that the more buys she brought to the supplier, 
the greater her percentage. The defendant denied the 
statement. The Fifth Circuit Court concluded that all the 
evidence was consistent with the defendant's assertion 
that she was only acting as a purchasing agent, there was 
no evidence that defendant received any profit or Wcis 
associated with the supplier. The court reversed the sales 
conviction saying that it must have been based on mere 
speculation and, therefore, the trial court should have 
directed a verdict of acquittal. 
In adopting the procuring agent rule to drug 
cases, the Third Circuit stated: 
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Court tit a Led: •• ' • " ' 
It seems rather fundamental that one 
cannot be found guilty of being a "seller" 
where he has not acted for the supplier but 
solely for the recipient. IdL at 1159• 
Similar I v , M m Pennsyl van i a Supreme i • 
as a matter of lav that a person, noi employed by the 
supplier acting solely for the hnyei and receiving no 
profit thereby, i ajinot be convicted nf selJ m g narcotics. 
Recognizing that the procuring agent defense has been 
recognized in most federal! I'lrcuil". mnl iii.iiir, strttf" 'nulls, 
the Oklahoma court in Posey v. State, 507 P.2d 57 6 (Okl. 
1973) held that where the "go-between" defendant had no 
financial interest in the sale, nor pre-arranged plan 
or conspiracy with the supplier, it would be mere specu-
lation to convict the defendant of selling narcotics. 
The court, citing a Michigan case, People v. Turner, 38 
Mich. App. 479, 196 N.S. 2d 799 (1972) noted: 
....a procuring agent who buys from 
a third party with funds provided by his 
principal, and at the principal's request, 
is far from different from the employee 
of a narcotic's peddler. It is only the 
latter individual who can in any sense be 
considered to be a seller of narcotics. 
Id, at 579. 
In the instant case, none of the alleged facts showr that 
defendant received any profit from the transaction nor 
was employed by the seller. Under such circumstances, 
the procuring agent rule applied and all sale charges against 
this defendant should be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that appellant's conviction 
should be reversed, since the acts of a procuring agent 
do not consitute distribution of a controlled substance 
for value. 
Respectfully submitted, 
D. Gilbert Athay 
Attorney for Appellant 
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